Introduction
In his book 'Leadership Without Easy Answers ' Heifetz (1994, p.22 ) posits that leadership is adaptive work, "adaptive work consists of learning required to address conflicts in the values that people hold or to diminish the gap between the values people stand for and the realities they face". This paper examines that learning, encapsulated by Heifetz (1994) as adaptive leadership, through a case study in which the author, as a UN Commander in Bosnia's war, faced an ethical dilemma that tested his values and leadership efficacy. It was a Wicked Problem with no discernible solution. His decision on the evacuation of a village would cost lives and fracture relationships.
In their landmark paper 'Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning ' Rittel and Webber (1973) introduced us to the typology of Tame (benign) and Wicked (malignant) problems. Tame Problems, they argue, are described as definable in terms of the scope of the problem, the process for solving the problem and the fact that the solution, when found, is self-evident; essentially the problem is bounded.
Wicked Problems on the other hand have no such reassuringly bounded space, they are unbounded: there is no test to validate the solution to a Wicked Problem as there is no way to trace the "waves of consequence over an extended -virtually an unbounded-period of time" (Rittel and Webber, 1973 p. 163) . In their paper Rittel and Webber (1973, pp. 161-167) propose at least ten distinguishing properties of a Wicked Problem clarifying the ambiguity, complexity and uncertainty of the description, causal relationships and illimitable challenges inherent in these problems. They argue that it is morally objectionable to treat a Wicked Problem as though it were Tame or to tame a Wicked Problem prematurely (Rittel and Webber 1973, p. 161) . The case study provides a poignant validation of this assertion and highlights the impossible choices people have to make, and live with, when confronting Wicked Problems. The realm of impossible choices is explored by Schulzke (2013, p.96) , in his paper 'Ethically Insoluble Dilemmas in War' where he argued that moral theories are usually based on the assumption that individuals can be in control of their actions. He explores the theories of 'moral luck' to illustrate the extent to which factors beyond the individual's control influence their actions and the consequences of these actions.
The leadership experiences of the author in Bosnia highlight Heifitz's (1994) idea of adaptive leadership when faced with an ethically insoluble dilemma (Schulzke 2013) as the crucial information to understand the situation and evaluate a moral course of action was entangled in the Wicked Problem. The 'morally objectionable' option of attempting to tame the problem was taken temporarily until the full reality of the Wicked Problem and ensuing waves of consequence manifested themselves in a crisis or Critical Problem (Grint 2005) . Critical Problems are a crisis where the leader faces a situation requiring immediate direct action to resolve the crisis. There is little or no time for thinking, reaction must be swift and resolute. The crisis for the author was how you make a moral judgement when faced with a Wicked Problem and lead in a situation where realities challenge values and judgement is questioned.
In an examination of leadership ethics within an ethical conundrum set in Holocaustera Hungary Sanders (2016 p.6) argues, "high stake existential emergencies have a tendency to render conventional ethics approaches, such as utilitarianism and deontology inoperable." Sanders contends that leadership, in such 'moral grey zones' has to engage with the specific challenges of duress ethics and the theorem of dirty hands rather than conventional ethical theories. The paper will draw on Sanders' (2010 Sanders' ( , 2016 ethical framing of Wicked Problems and duress ethics and offer additional insights for the notion of duress ethics and examples of the communication contradictions inherent in double effect or double bind theory (Bateson et al. 1956; Bateson 1972; Gibney 2006) . Double effect or double bind theory underpins the idea of dilemmas based on contradictory communication and resultant demands being placed on an individual leading to a response construed as incorrect: dammed if you do, doomed if you don't.
Following a review of ethical leadership literature Monahan (2012 p.63) concludes that there are undefined grey areas within ethical leadership and while the literature reviews 'ethical dilemmas and problems' it is 'cautious on offering solutions'. Jones (1991) discusses the synthesis of ethical decision models introducing the concept of Moral Intensity generally making the assumption that the agent has the autonomy to act morally. A theme Jensen (2013) examines through a series of case studies in his paper 'Hard Moral Choices in the Military'. Wicked Problems, certainly in this case study appear to deny the leader the freedom to act morally. Brown and Trevino (2006) examine the field of research in leadership and ethics and argue that ethical leadership remains largely unexplored.
The paper, through a detailed post hoc reflective examination of the case study, will explore ethical leadership and argue that Rittel and Webber's (1973) problem typology might offer a framework for virtuous sense making when faced with an ethical dilemma. The paper concludes by supporting and contributing to Sanders' ideas on grey zones and duress ethics when confronting Wicked Problems. In the case study there appeared to be no appropriate ethical decision making models based on deontological principles and no appropriate teleological cost benefit analytical frameworks. The leader must be prepared to lead in the moral grey zone retaining legitimacy and when denied the autonomy to act with moral certainty make a morally 'good enough' decision accepting the resultant 'dirty hands' (Walzer, 1973 is beyond the scope of this paper, a brief synopsis, focused on the complexities of Bosnia, is required to provide a degree of context, a critical dimension of any case study or leadership narrative. Glenny (1999, pp.634-662) provides an authoritative account of the genesis of the Balkan Wars and the 1990s Bosnian Conflict, notably the initial fighting between Serbia and Croatia as they attempted to create ethnically homogenous national entities and the Serbian / Bosnian Serbian struggle for ethnic dominance at the expense of the Bosnian Croats and Muslims in Bosnia Herzegovina. Bellamy (1996, pp. 111-123) provides a different perspective but supporting corollary to Glenny's (1999) (Glenny 1999, pp.636-638 Glenny, 1999; Benson ,2004) .
Bosnia was the most culturally mixed of all the republics of Yugoslavia; the 1991 population census figures disclosed: Muslims 44%, Serbs 31% and Croats 17% (Ogata 2005, p.51) . By June 1992 Serb forces were controlling two-thirds of BosniaHerzegovina and had forced a million people from their homes (Ogata, 2005 p.51 ). the 'players', including the United Nations, was to monitor the three dimensions understanding the implications of the moves and understanding the strategy of the 'game'. Some of the 'players' lost perspective of the 'game', playing their own agenda thereby derailing the strategy, if there was one. Who the players were and who at any one time was 'playing' the game, was part of the Wicked Problem.
The Value of Case Study
This paper attempts an exercise in reflective learning through interpretative scholarship (Crotty 1998 ) and retrospective sense making (Weick 1995) . It will draw on a real world context situating the narrative in the ethnographic tradition (Fetterman 2009) . Through the exploration of this 'wrong wrong' dilemma as a case study it hopes to examine the role of ethics when leading Wicked Problems: a case study in leading within the grey zone (Levi 1986; Sanders 2016 ) of extreme moral ambiguity. Yin (2009) describes Case Study as the examination of a real life contemporary phenomenon and cautions on the use of multiple sources of evidence. Welsh and Lyons (2001) argue that outcomes from individual case studies are not statistically generalizable but are analytically generalizable. Eisenhardt (1989) in her article 'Building Theories from Case Study Research' explains how case studies can be used to various ends including providing description, testing theory or generating theory. As an exercise in retrospective sense making the author attempts to make sense of the events he faced as a UN Acting Battalion Commander. The biases and heuristics of the author will undoubtedly shade the case study. Multiple sources of evidence are used to build the case study and rationalise the author's recollection of events.
The paper will also draw on Grint's (2005) conceptual leadership framework or heuristic, where he introduced a third problem, the Critical problem to complement Tame and Wicked and proposed approaches, or leadership styles described as, Command, Manage and Lead, specific to the problems Critical, Tame and Wicked. Grint's (2008) heuristic will be utilised to further make sense or draw meaning and possibly lessons from the leadership challenges described in the case study. The critical examination of the case study will explore how the context of the war in Bosnia met Rittel and Webber's (1973) criteria for a Wicked Problem, however the default leadership approach by Governments, officials and UN soldiers on the ground was to seek reassuring Tame solutions the consequences of which were crisis, failure and fractured relationships. The reality of confronting a Wicked Problem in Bosnia in 1993 and the ethical leadership challenges this presented appeared to be intractable.
Literature: Ethics, Leadership and Command
In contemporary moral philosophy (Alexander and Moore, 2016) Deontology (from the Greek words for duty deon and science or study logos) is a normative theory guiding what we ought to do (deontic theories), or are required, permitted or forbidden to do, a set of rules. The absolutist conception of Deontology was expressed by Kant (1780, p.100) "Better the whole people should perish than an injustice be done". Another perspective of this normative theory is 'Threshold Deontology', Moore (1997, ch 17) pragmatically argues that deontological norms govern up to a point despite adverse consequences but when the consequences become so dire that they cross a stipulated threshold, consequentialism or utilitarianism, the ethics of consequences, takes over. Those that generally subscribe to deontological theories of morality oppose the consequentialists and pragmatism citing the Kantian (1780) tradition.
A counter ethical theory to Deontology, Utilitarianism, emerged from the 18 th and 19 th Century philosophers and economists Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill (Benthem 1907; Mill 1871) . They argued that the right action promotes 'happiness' and the wrong action the reverse. The theory argues that the best action is the one that maximises utility, Bentham (1907) described Utility as the sum of all pleasures that result from an action less the suffering of anyone involved. It is a theory of consequences, the result of the action is the standard of right and wrong. When the result is the greatest happiness (utility) the action is right.
A third tradition of moral ethics is focussed not on the rules, duties or consequences but on the actor and what kind of a person the actor is or should be, described as aretaic or virtue ethics. According to Aristotle, there are no rules for leading ethically:
as he suggests in his Nicomachean Ethics (Ross 1984, book ii 2 (19) ) 'the agents must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion'. Aristotle's emphasis on the 'good, or virtue is a recurring theme in leadership literature (Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999; Burns, 1978; Greenleaf,1977; Heifitz, 1994; Peterson et.al. 2012 ).
The ethical arguments in a more contemporary sense will draw on Williams and Smart (1973) with arguments for and against Utilitarianism, and Gewirth (1982) examining the Deontological argument that certain rights are held to be absolute and rights are infringed when the correlative duty is not carried out. Van Staveren (2007) makes the point, examining economics that Virtue Ethics are beyond Utilitarianism and Deontology as the 'good' has no universal standard and moral behaviour is imperfect and continuously adapting to changing social circumstances, later introduced in the paper as a moral 'Grey Zone' (Levi 1986) .
The paper will suggest the case study appeared to show that ethical decisions within a Tame Problem, real or socially constructed, seemed to sit within Moral Absolutist or Deontological ethics . Addressing a Tame (Utilitarianism/Consequentialism). The Kantian argument that the only absolutely good thing is good will, that is the motive of the person, may be the moral arbiter in this case study. An honest reflection on the motives behind the selected course of action and the degree to which they were manifestations of good will or virtuous character remain, for the author, inexorably entangled in the Wicked Problem of the Bosnian war (Dannatt, 2016 pp. 220-229) and its grey zone morality.
In Primo Levi's post hoc analytically constructed 'Grey Zone', hauntingly portrayed in the 'Drowned and the Saved' (Levi 1986) If any conclusion is to be drawn from the study of leadership literature: academic, biographical, autobiographical or historical, it may be that it is a contested subject. Commander has the more difficult task, as the commanded, who are remote from the Commander must be trusted to know the 'way', recognise the 'end' (end state) and be capable of looking after themselves. Equally, they must know that they will be supported and the 'end' is of value. This Command framework as described by
Smith (2005) (Bateson et al 1956; Bateson 1972, pp. 206-212) .
Essentially the victim, in this case the Acting Battalion Commander, find themselves in a communication matrix in which messages contradict each other, the contradiction remains with the victim and the 'victim' cannot escape the field of interaction.
In attempting this critical enquiry there may be wider, if not specific, lessons for leadership in complex environments or complex adaptive systems of interactions (Hazy 2008) . This is characterised within a Wicked Problem in this narrative and might be a fruitful area of study for students of leadership and those that would grapple with volatile uncertainty and moral ambiguity in the usually Wicked Problem of leading peacekeeping or broader international intervention (Schulzke 2013; Jenson 2013) . In Bosnia leading within uncertainty and ambiguity in a volatile environment appeared to create a need for certainty on the part of the leader and the led, the commander and the commanded no matter how fleeting or illusionary.
Leaders attempted to tame the Wicked Problem to provide the delusion of moral certainty and measurable progress. The challenge for the Acting Battalion
Commander was to instil confidence in the subordinates whilst attempting to attain their followership and avoid becoming overwhelmed and diminished by the wickedness of the Bosnian problem described below. November (Stewart ,1993 pp.19-105) . The author joined BRITBAT 1 in early
February 1993 as second-in-command (Stewart 1993 p.255) .
While acting as the Battalion Commander of BRITBAT 1, having 'stepped up' from second in command, in the early hours of the 18 th April 1993 the author faced a dilemma as described by Ogata above, while supporting the UNHCR's operations in central Bosnia. This 'wrong, wrong' dilemma was on the face of it ethical, it also generated an ethical leadership quandary.
The problem was that while the situation, in its broadest sense, was not of the Acting Battalion Commander's making, the courses of action facing him would result in terrible things happening to many people: so on the face of it, it was a question of which outcome (wave of repercussions, Rittel and Webber 1973, p.163) would be worse. In Nagel's (1972) argument it was a case of evaluating alternative pathways or measures to be taken between total outcomes based on the Utilitarian or Deontological (Absolutist) perspective. The Utilitarian perspective, the rightness or wrongness of action is based on the resulting consequences (greatest good (happiness) for the greatest number (Bentham 1907; Mill 1871 There was a palpable sense that BRITBAT 1 was at last doing something to make a direct humanitarian difference (Mooney 1995 ones" (Rittel and Webber 1973, p.169) .
Upon further reflection and discussion, Rittel and Webber's (1973) 
Leading in Wicked Problems
Can you train for or be prepared for leading in moral ambiguity? Aristotle argued in Nicomachean Ethics (Ross 1984, i 4 (3) Aristotle argued (Ross 1984, book ii 4 (18-19) ) that virtue could only be learnt through engagement with a virtuous community. (Ross, 1984, book vi 5 (98) ). This might be construed as honing a moral absolutist intuition or moral compass. As ethical theory provides no absolute answers, thus morality is not fixed, the study of ethics equips the leader with the frameworks for argument and the potential to justify decisions and dirty hands.
Contemporary leadership literature's emphasis on moral leadership may have begun with Burns (1978, p.20) Peace keeping and wider intervention operations would appear to increasingly operate in the 'grey zone', this strange morality or amorality was captured by Primo Levi (1988, pp. 22-51 
Conclusion
A leadership lesson from this case study may be the requirement to be prepared for Wicked Problems and ethical ambiguity or a Grey Zone (Levi 1986; Sanders 2016 saw duties as absolute and prohibited using people as a means to an end. The
Utilitarian/Consequentialist course appeared to be to stop the evacuation thus potentially avoid greater harm to a greater number of civilians. In the Bosnian Grey Zone, the potential greater casualties appeared a less acceptable option than the fewer certain casualties, possibly an illustration of duress ethics (Sanders 2016 ) and seeking splattered rather than dirty hands. Neither course of action was correct, there was no correct solution: it was a Wicked problem.
The wider lesson for the peacekeeper or interventionists might be that the elegant 'road map' to peace would appear at best elusive or at worst illusionary and belong to the seductive domain of the Tame Problem where differences are reconcilable and solutions morality discernible and self-evident. Developing leaders or appointing those capable of tackling Wicked Problems, in whatever context, would seem to favour the pragmatic approach of the 'Bricoleur' (Grint 2008) and concepts embodying models such as Emergent Strategy (Mintzberg et.al. 1999) The challenge for the leader in the Wicked Problem's critical argument space or when leading the Wicked Problem is to collaboratively discern an acceptable 'End'
(end state). Possibly and more realistically, it is to pragmatically identify its direction, have the confidence to seek out the 'Way' whilst harmonising the paradoxical performance measures (tracking judgement and actions) and remaining aware there will never be sufficient 'Means'. Sharing the fact that the 'Way' is not known or the 'End' may be indistinct with the wider followership or wider actors and stakeholders presents a particular conundrum that is an inherent part of the Wicked Problem.
Those who can cope with the knowledge that the leader does not know the way or has no certainty as to the end and has no road map may be leaders themselves and can assist the leader or join a cadre of leaders (Kakabadse 2000) in the critical argument space. Those who need reassurance of the leader's omnipotence are destined to remain followers; those who would exploit the situation to personal advantage must be carefully managed. The leader must seek out the leaders within the followership and wider stakeholder community and join them in the critical argument space to build enduring trust while seeking the 'Way' and divining the 'End' from the paradox of performance measures so they recognise it (Smith 2005, p.65) as better or worse, satisfying or good enough (Rittel and Webber 1973, p.163) .
In 2005 an American commander in Iraq was explaining to a reporter that he did not know the 'Way' and that in order to discover it "we are learning from current events". . This highlights the risk of sharing uncertainty with those who would exploit it, a conundrum for all leaders in the Wicked Problem space.
The author continues to reflect on that time, the sleep test (Badaracco 1997 ) is passed, mostly, presumably based on Kant's assertion that the only absolutely good thing is good will, or the absence of personal agenda. The experience informed future decisions made by the author as an adaptive commander/leader in other 4
The article in the Stars and Stripes Magazine (20 April 2005) was headed: "Building an Iraqi police force from scratch Maj. Gen. Fil, U.S. team find themselves relying on current events for direction". Maj. Gen. Joseph Fil doesn't own a how-to manual titled "Building a Police Force in the Midst of an Insurgency." He's winging it. The article was not well received by the Pentagon. The author was General Fil's senior planner. http://www.stripes.com/news/building-an-iraqi-police-force-from-scratch-1.32153
Wicked Problem spaces. In those spaces, he hoped for better moral luck and to avoid dirty hands (Nagel 1979; Williams 1981; Schulzke 2013; Sanders 2016) however, dirty hands and Wicked Problems retained their correlation.
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